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ST. LOUIS TAW REVIEW
STATE EXEMPTION STATUTES IN BANKRUPTCY
Within the last few years the American lawyer has begun
to realize the importance of bankruptcy as a branch of mod-
ern law. Before that time this subject was looked upon with
disfavor, as an unnecessary evil which hindered creditors in
getting at the assets of an insolvent and which encouraged in-
solvency on the part of debtors. Because of the statutory
existence of Bankruptcy and because of its rigid and arbitrary
rules it is a subject hard to master and has brought into be-
ing a class of lawyers who specialize in Bankruptcy and who
are finding it quite a profitable field. Thus while the value of
bankruptcy as an essential part of the law is slowly being
recognized, the great majority of lawyers know little about the
subject and are too content to let it alone.
It is to be regretted that bankruptcy has been so widely
misunderstood. It is an exceedingly interesting subject and
in spite of its stiff, formal phrasing every section of the Bank-
ruptcy Act contains one or more hidden problems of the most
interesting kind.
In Missouri we have a statute which reads as follows:
"Policy for benefit of Married Women-Any policy of Insur-
ance heretofore or hereafter made by any insurance company
on the life of any person, expressed to be for the benefit of
the wife of the insured, shall inure to her s-parate benefit,
independently of the creditors, executors and administrators
of the husband; provided, however, that in the event of the
death or divorcement of the wife before the decease of the
husband he shall have the right to designate another bene-
ficiary upon written notice to the company, but such notice
shall not be effected, unless endorsed upon the policy by the
president or vice-president and secretary of the Company is-
suing the policy. But when the premiums paid in any year
out of the funds or property of the husband shall exceed the
sum of five hundred dollars, such exemptions from such claims
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shall not apply to so much of said premiums so paid as shall
be in excess of five hundred dollars (but such excess shall
inure to the benefit of his creditors)."
The case of Haven v. Home Co. (149 Mo. App. 291), de-
clared that this statute was in the nature of an exemption
statute, and thus it follows that under this statute such poli-
cies of insurance are exempt from the control of a trustee in
bankruptcy of the husband's estate under the Bankruptcy Act
which provides:
"See. 6. Exemption of Bankrupts-(a) This act shall not
affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are
prescribed by the state laws in force at the time of the filing
of the petition in the state wherein they have had their domi-
cile for the six months or the greater portion thereof im-
mediately preceding the filing of the petition."
This seems easy enough. Insurance taken out for the bene-
fit of a wife is not liable for the husband's debts, even though
taken out on the husband's life, under the state laws; and
under the Bankruptcy Act such insurance is free from the
control of the husband's trustee in bankruptcy under the sec-
tion inimediately above, of the Bankruptcy Act. But what
would be the case if the wife obtained a divorce either before
or after the beginning of bankruptcy proceedings and the
husband did not exercise his right to change the beneficiary?
Further, let us suppose that the control of the policy is so
largely in the hands of the husband that it could hardly be
said to be a policy for the benefit of the wife, would such a
policy be exempt under above named sections? It seems at
first blush, that if the husband, under the terms of the policy,
could change the beneficiary at his will, the policy would not
be exempt from the control of the trustee under Sec. 70 (a)
of the Bankruptcy Act which says in part:
"Title to Property-(a) The trustee of the estate of a
*Note-Sec. 6944 R. S. Mo. 1909, Sec. 6149 R. S. Mo. 1919.
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bankrupt, upon his appointment and qualification, and his suc-
cessor or successors, if he shall have one or more, upon his or
their appointment and qualification, shall in turn be vested
by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as of the
date he was adjudged a bankrupt, except in so far.as it is to
property which is exempt, to all ...... (b) property which
prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have
transfe rred or which might have been levied on and sold under
judicial process against him ............... "
Now it seems that if a bankrupt had a policy of insurance
on his life for the benefit of his wife, but which by its terms
allowed him to change the beneficiary at will, the policy would
pass to the trustee in bankruptcy in spite of the state exemp-
tion laws and See. 6 of the Bankruptey Act.
All of these problems have been solved in the Orear Case,
189 Fed. 888. This case is so clearly stated and is of such un-
doubted merit that it is surprising that it is not better known.
The case came up from Missouri and the facts were as
follows:
Orear was the trustee in bankruptcy for the insolvent part-
nership of Derr Bros., which firm was composed of Jacob W.
Derr and Chas. C. Derr, who were adjudged bankrupts by
the United States District Couit for the Eastern District of
Missouri. There had been eight policies of life insurance for
$2,500 each on the life of J. W. Derr which were in force at
the time of adjudication in bankruptcy. One of these policies,
numbered 656,496, was issued bythe Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance Co. on the 27th day of January, 1906, two years be-
fore the adjudication in bankruptcy. The policy was payable
to Myrtle L. Derr, wife of Jacob Derr. Myrtle L. Derr had
obtained a divorce from her husband on October 1, 1908, which
was after the adjudication of bankruptcy. The husband had
not exercised his right to change the beneficiary as provided
for in the policy as follows:
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"The insured may nominate a beneficiary or beneficiaries
hereunder and may also change any beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries nominated by him or named in the policy. A bene-
ficiary or beneficiaries in succession to be known as contingent
beneficiary or beneficiaries may be nominated by the insured
or if not nominated by him by the beneficiary or benefliries
if of lawful age. Contingent beneficiary or beneficiaiies nmty
be changed by the insured or the person or persons nominat-
ing same."
The trustee bringing suit to obtain this policy of insurance
relied on these facts.
First-That, since the policy allowed the insured certain
benefits during his life and allowed him to change the bene-
ficiary at his pleasure, the policy was not for the benefit of
his wife within the meaning of the Missouri statute.
Second-That since the wife had obtained a divorce from
Jacob W. Derr the exemption, if any, was lost.
Third-That the exemption, if any, was personal to Myrtle
L. Derr and that since she had not appeared and claimed the
exemption, it was lost.
The Court in a very well written opinion delivered by Cir-
cuit Judge Smith decided every point in favor of the wife
and declared that the trustee had no interest in the policy.
The opinion declares in part:
" .......... If the first point (made by the trustee) should
be sustained it would practically nullify the statute (refer-
ring to the Missouri Exemption Statute above)... The primary
purpose of such policies is still to insure against death and
usually for the benefit of those dependent upon the insured,
and when a modern policy is made, as in this case, payable
upon the death of the insured to his wife by name as bene-
ficiary, the fact that the insured may have the right to change
the beneficiary or enjoy certain collateral rights in his lifetime,
does not make it any less a policy of insurance made by an
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insurance company expressed to be for the benefit of the
wife of the insured within the meaning of the statute in
question ...........
...... "The second proposition of the trustee is equally
without merit .... This policy by the Missouri statute, if it be-
longed to the bankrupt in any sense, was declared to inure to
the separate benefit of Myrtle L. Derr independently of the
creditors of the husband and was not of such a character as
to pass to the trustee even if the seventeenth section did not
expressly exclude all exempt property from the grant to the
trustee ...........
.......... "It is finally contended (by the trustee) that
exemption is a personal privilege which can only be set up
by the party entitled thereto, and as Myrtle L. Derr has not
appeared and claimed the policy on her own behalf it should
be awarded to the trustee. This involves several errors. The
trustee is seeking to obtain property the title to which he
never took. The trustee, it is true, is seeking to obtain exempt
property bipt the trouble with his claim is that he has no title
to the property he seeks to hold ........." C. W. D.
The decision of In re Brinson, 262 Fed. 707, arising from Mississippi
court on petition to revise order of referee, upholds doctrine expressed in the
Orear case and goes further in holding that "The fact that the insured
reserved the absolute right to change the beneficiary did not destroy the
exempt character of the proceeds of the policy." Citing in support In re
Carlon (D. C.) 189 Fed. 815; Allen v. Central Wisconain Trust Co., 143 WiL.
381, 127 N. W. 1003. Ed.
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